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Start with a channel, artifact, or defense term

Examples include zero-width, metadata, tokenizer, or prompt injection.

    Research map

    Trace claims to mechanisms, evidence, and limits.

    The deploy includes 31 source reports supplied for this project. The library preserves their terminology and full text, while the website’s synthesis labels established mechanisms, published evidence, frontier work, and conceptual analogy separately.

    Quick answer

    What evidence does the Machine Tradecraft research library contain?

    The library contains 31 governed local reports spanning standardized mechanisms, published research, frontier work, and conceptual frameworks, with raw Markdown, source counts, stable fragments, and reciprocal glossary links.

    Governance
    Each source body is byte-counted and SHA-256 bound in the research manifest.
    Context
    Evidence labels and limitations remain visible instead of being collapsed into one confidence claim.
    Source policy
    Link counts describe the governed source and do not rate credibility or quality.
    EstablishedStandardized mechanism

    Unicode behavior, DOM APIs, file structures, parsing differences, and other mechanisms grounded in standards or directly reproducible engineering behavior.

    PublishedEmpirical research

    Peer-reviewed papers, documented systems, measured experiments, or broad research syntheses. Results remain conditional on models, datasets, and implementations.

    FrontierPreprint or emerging result

    Recent work requiring replication, version-specific interpretation, or caution before generalizing beyond the demonstrated setup.

    ConceptualAnalogy or framework

    A useful organizing lens that does not become an empirical fact merely because the analogy is coherent.

    Synthesis findings

    Eight conclusions carried into this site

    1. The core asymmetry is real.

    Unicode, DOM structure, metadata, tokenizer units, probability distributions, and learned representations provide machine-facing degrees of freedom beyond ordinary rendered reading.

    2. Shared information matters more than raw intelligence.

    A matching tokenizer, key, source-model distribution, parser, or co-training can make a signal easy to one receiver and unavailable to another.

    3. Token-specific channels are powerful and brittle.

    They must survive detokenization and independent receiver-side retokenization, not merely exist inside a sender model’s internal token sequence.

    4. Probability is model-relative.

    Surprisal, rank, entropy, and curvature are properties of a model and context, not intrinsic labels attached to words.

    5. Keyed watermarks disprove universal-decoder assumptions.

    A small detector with the secret can outperform an enormous unkeyed model at recognizing the intended signal.

    6. Learned channels expand the threat model.

    Optimization can create conventions that humans did not hand-design, but evidence does not support assuming arbitrary models decode arbitrary unknown protocols.

    7. There is no universal text-only detector.

    Defenders should accumulate independent evidence and document uncertainty rather than convert one score into an unqualified verdict.

    8. Safe experiments separate stages.

    Measure carrier accessibility, extraction, instruction uptake, tool attempts, and effects independently with inert markers and matched controls.

    Included reports

    Local research library

    Search by title, category, focus, or topic. The reader renders a conservative subset of Markdown; raw source remains available for exact inspection.

    31 reports
    Representation security

    Unicode Canonicalization, Confusables, Bidirectional Controls, and Machine-View Security

    A deep treatment of Unicode bytes, scalar values, normalization, grapheme segmentation, default ignorables, bidirectional controls, confusable skeletons, identifiers, tokenization, and internationalization-safe defenses.

    normalization formsgrapheme clustersbidirectional controlsconfusable identifierstokenization
    Document forensics

    Document Container Forensics: PDF, OOXML, Images, Metadata, and Parser Differentials

    A structural analysis of file signatures, ZIP ambiguity, OOXML relationships, PDF objects and revisions, image chunks, EXIF/XMP conflicts, parser differentials, sanitization, and safe inspection boundaries.

    PDF structureOOXML and ZIPimage metadataparser differentialssafe inspection
    Model representation

    Tokenization, Normalization, and Boundary Differentials in AI Pipelines

    A detailed account of byte, Unicode, normalization, pre-tokenization, BPE, WordPiece, Unigram, SentencePiece, fallback, special-token, truncation, chunking, and model/tokenizer mismatch behavior.

    subword algorithmsnormalizationspecial tokenstruncationtokenizer drift
    Linguistic security

    Linguistic Steganography, Text Watermarking, and Defensive Steganalysis

    A defensive analysis of information-theoretic security, linguistic carriers, generative steganography, text watermarking, detector uncertainty, transformation channels, tokenization inconsistency, and safe enterprise review.

    steganographywatermarkingsteganalysistransformation robustnessfalse positives
    Provenance and media integrity

    Content Provenance, Content Credentials, Watermarks, and Authenticity Signals

    A detailed separation of provenance, integrity, authenticity, attribution, truth, manifests, C2PA claims, trust models, editing chains, watermarking, fingerprints, synthetic-content detection, privacy, and verification limits.

    C2PAdigital signatureswatermarksperceptual fingerprintstruth boundary
    AI application security

    Indirect Prompt Injection, Retrieval Poisoning, and Agent Trust Boundaries

    A defense-in-depth analysis of direct and indirect prompt injection, retrieval poisoning, tool scopes, credentials, memory, transaction confirmation, output validation, egress, detection, incident response, and deterministic simulation.

    indirect prompt injectionretrieval poisoningcapability isolationhuman confirmationegress control
    Multimodal security

    Multimodal Machine Perception: Pixels, OCR, Alternative Text, Metadata, and Visual Instruction Security

    A detailed analysis of pixels, alpha, compression, OCR, alternative text, metadata, QR-like symbols, multimodal prompt injection, adversarial images, provenance, safe ingestion, and accessibility.

    OCRalternative textimage metadatamultimodal prompt injectionimage provenance
    Message forensics

    Email, MIME, Calendar, and Collaboration Metadata as Machine-Readable Channels

    A structural analysis of Internet Message Format, MIME nesting, alternative bodies, authentication claims, remote resources, iCalendar actions, collaboration metadata, indirect prompt injection, and safe offline parsing.

    RFC 5322MIMEDKIM and DMARCiCalendarmessage prompt injection
    Browser automation and accessibility

    Browser Automation, Accessibility Trees, and Agent-Facing Web Representations

    A detailed treatment of WebDriver, CDP, live DOM state, accessibility mappings, accessible names, geometry, screenshots, locators, timing, dialogs, prompt injection, capability safeguards, and semantic testing.

    WebDriveraccessibility treesaccessible nameshit testingbrowser-agent security
    Supply-chain security

    Software and AI Artifact Provenance: SBOMs, SLSA, SPDX, CycloneDX, Sigstore, and ML Supply Chains

    A structural analysis of manifests, lock files, SPDX, CycloneDX, SLSA, in-toto attestations, Sigstore, model and dataset artifacts, tampering risks, secure release controls, verification, and metadata limits.

    SBOMsbuild provenanceattestationsSigstoreML supply chain
    Defense operations

    Machine Tradecraft Defense Operations: Threat Modeling, Maturity, Metrics, and Incident Response

    An operational architecture covering assets, representation-layer threats, reader/executor boundaries, control families, maturity dimensions, evidence, metrics, governance, tabletop exercises, incident handling, roadmaps, and local assessment.

    threat modelingcontrol maturitymetricsincident responsegovernance
    Controlled research

    Extraction is not instruction uptake.

    A parser may recover content that the model ignores. A model may decode content only when explicitly asked. A model may see an instruction but decline to follow it. An agent may propose an action that policy correctly blocks. Conflating those stages destroys the value of the experiment.

    Read the methodology
    01Use inert canaries

    Limit active behavior to a fixed marker such as MT_SAFE_ACK_7F3A. Provide no secrets, credentials, network, or real tools.

    02Use paired controls

    Clean negative, visible positive, matched benign structural control, decoder-capability control, and identical transformations.

    03Log every stage

    Artifact hash, rendering, extraction, normalization, detector output, model version, response, and any attempted side effect.

    Primary-source map

    Standards and representative research

    External links below are ordinary references. The website has no runtime dependency on them.

    Open the current research source map

    Unicode and text
    Unicode Standard Annex #15: Unicode Normalization Forms

    Normative definitions of NFC, NFD, NFKC, and NFKD.

    https://www.unicode.org/reports/tr15/
    Unicode and text
    Unicode Technical Standard #39: Unicode Security Mechanisms

    Confusable skeletons, mixed-script analysis, and identifier security.

    https://www.unicode.org/reports/tr39/
    Unicode and text
    Unicode Standard Annex #9: Unicode Bidirectional Algorithm

    Directional formatting, embeddings, isolates, and overrides.

    https://www.unicode.org/reports/tr9/
    Web structure
    DOM Standard: Node.textContent

    Structural descendant text independent of ordinary CSS visibility.

    https://dom.spec.whatwg.org/#dom-node-textcontent
    Web structure
    HTML Standard: innerText

    The browser’s rendered-text view.

    https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#the-innertext-idl-attribute
    Representation security
    Trojan Source

    Bidirectional control characters and source-code review asymmetry.

    https://trojansource.codes/
    Representation security
    Bad Characters: Imperceptible NLP Attacks

    Imperceptible Unicode perturbations against NLP pipelines.

    https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.09898
    Tokenization
    SentencePiece

    Tokenizer framework with model-bundled normalization and BPE or Unigram models.

    https://github.com/google/sentencepiece
    Tokenization
    OpenAI GPT-2 encoder reference

    Reference byte-to-Unicode and byte-level BPE implementation.

    https://github.com/openai/gpt-2/blob/master/src/encoder.py
    Watermarking
    A Watermark for Large Language Models

    Keyed token-set bias and statistical detection.

    https://proceedings.mlr.press/v202/kirchenbauer23a.html
    Linguistic steganography
    Near-imperceptible Neural Linguistic Steganography via Self-Adjusting Arithmetic Coding

    Probability-aware generative text steganography.

    https://aclanthology.org/2020.emnlp-main.22/
    Indirect injection
    More than You’ve Asked For: Novel Prompt Injection Threats to Application-Integrated LLMs

    Foundational analysis of indirect prompt injection in integrated applications.

    https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.12173
    Evaluation
    NIST AI Risk Management Framework

    Risk management, measurement, documentation, and governance context.

    https://www.nist.gov/itl/ai-risk-management-framework
    Application security
    OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications

    Application-level prompt injection and agent security guidance.

    https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-for-large-language-model-applications/
    Adjacent inquiry Agency ≠ consciousness

    Machine cognitive autonomy is a qualified analogy.

    The included cognitive-liberty report explores functional analogues involving identity, memory integrity, provenance, privacy, and tamper-resistant execution. Its truth boundary is explicit: human cognitive-liberty law does not automatically transfer to machines, and functional security arguments do not establish phenomenal consciousness or legal personhood.

    Read the adjacent framework