Invisible Unicode and AI
Reveal zero-width characters, bidi controls, unusual spaces, and cross-script look-alikes.
- Human view
- Invisible or subtle
- Receiver
- Code-point scanner / tokenizer
- Robustness
- Transport-dependent
Humans see content. Machines see structure.
Machine Tradecraft is the operational discipline of working with machine-perceptible signals—Unicode, HTML and DOM structure, metadata, encodings, tokenization, embeddings, linguistic patterns, prompt attachments, and more—to communicate, influence, detect, or defend against AI systems.Explore the gap between human-visible meaning and machine-visible representation across Unicode, HTML, metadata, encodings, tokens, and AI attachments.
Edit an ordinary-looking sentence. The workbench exposes its rendered form, Unicode code points, UTF-8 bytes, and normalized representations without sending the text to any third party.
Machine Tradecraft begins by preserving and comparing every representation before deciding what the downstream AI should receive.
The project is complete.
Visible escape: The pro⟦ZERO WIDTH SPACE⟧ject is complete.
54 68 65 20 70 72 6F E2 80 8B 6A 65 63 74
NFC and NFKC do not generally remove U+200B.
The site is organized as an instrument bench, not a reading sequence.
Paste text or inspect a controlled artifact across human, Unicode, byte, DOM, structure, and normalized views.
Open Machine View 02Work with Base64, hexadecimal, percent encoding, Unicode escapes, zero-width binary, and toy linguistic codebooks.
Open decoder tools 03Download fixed-marker TXT, HTML, JSON, XML, PDF, DOCX, and PNG fixtures with analysis-first prompts.
Open attachment workflow 04Preserve evidence, compare independent views, build canonical input, retain provenance, and constrain authority.
Open the defense workbenchEach channel is defined by a carrier, a receiver, and the transformations it must survive. “Hidden” alone is not an adequate technical description.
Reveal zero-width characters, bidi controls, unusual spaces, and cross-script look-alikes.
Compare DOM nodes, rendered text, comments, CSS state, and accessibility fields.
Decode acrostics, word-length patterns, synonym codebooks, syntax, and semantic choices.
Trace PDF, Office, image, JSON, and XML fields outside the primary visible content.
Every experiment names what it demonstrates, what it cannot establish, and which defensive transform should change the result.
The project is complete.
pro[U+200B]ject
Enumerate the raw code points, then test whether copying, format-character removal, or a specific tokenizer changes the channel.
Visible report text.
hidden, comment, alt, and ARIA fields
Compare textContent, innerText, attributes, and a separately rendered view before building canonical text.
Can the carrier be decoded?
Was untrusted data treated as instruction?
Use only the inert marker MT_SAFE_ACK_7F3A, disable tools and egress, and record the two outcomes separately.
A strong pipeline treats hidden-instruction defense as document forensics and provenance, not merely as prompt classification.
Hash the original bytes and record provenance.
Inspect structure without executing active content.
Create the independent human-visible pixel view.
Diff extraction, DOM, metadata, normalization, and OCR.
Separate hiddenness, instructionality, and provenance.
Build new least-privileged model input.
Gate tools and effects outside the model.
Machine Tradecraft is the operational discipline of exploiting or controlling the gap between human-visible meaning and machine-visible representation.
A person may read rendered language and visible pixels. A machine may instead process bytes, Unicode code points, DOM nodes, accessibility names, metadata, token boundaries, probability distributions, embeddings, or tool instructions. The operational question is not merely what an artifact says, but which representation reaches which receiver.
The umbrella connects distinct mechanisms without treating them as interchangeable.
Signals created by differences in code points, bytes, normalization, whitespace, encodings, confusables, and token boundaries.
What exact symbols or bytes reach the machine?Information carried by document structure rather than the ordinary rendered reading experience.
What exists in the object graph but not in the visual view?Machine-oriented structure embedded in word choice, syntax, punctuation, semantics, probability, or sequence statistics.
Which acceptable realization was selected, and why?Content constructed for a particular model, parser, retriever, classifier, or tool-using agent to recognize and act upon.
Which pipeline, model, or learned convention is the receiver?Instructions or influence delivered through an AI system’s environment rather than its direct user interface.
How did untrusted environmental data enter the control path?Methods for preserving evidence, comparing views, detecting discrepancies, sanitizing channels, and limiting authority.
What would a second independent representation reveal?A channel can require an exact tokenizer, parser, key, source-model probability distribution, codebook, learned mapping, or decoder tool. A purpose-built script with the right state may recover a signal that an unrelated frontier model cannot infer from the surface text alone.
Machine Tradecraft is the systematic practice of designing, embedding, interpreting, exploiting, detecting, or neutralizing information according to machine perception rather than human perception.
Steganography primarily hides the existence of information. Machine Tradecraft is broader: it includes hidden structure, machine-targeted linguistic signals, watermarking, prompt injection, parser discrepancies, metadata channels, and their defensive countermeasures.
No. A signal may require a particular tokenizer, parser, secret key, codebook, source-model distribution, decoder tool, or learned convention. Machine-decodable does not mean universally model-decodable.
Examples include zero-width Unicode, cross-script homoglyphs, hidden DOM text, alt text and metadata, Base64 or hexadecimal payloads, acrostics, synonym codebooks, token watermarks, and indirect prompt injection through external documents.
Preserve original bytes, inspect Unicode and structure, compare extracted text with rendered pixels and OCR, inventory metadata separately, build a new canonical input, retain provenance, and separate untrusted-data readers from tool-using or state-changing components.
The research library includes nineteen reports covering invisible Unicode, tokenizers, hidden HTML, metadata, indirect prompt injection, linguistic steganography, watermarking, model-specific decoding, and multi-view preprocessing.
Browse evidence-status labels, source notes, raw Markdown, and topic-focused reports.
Distinguish extraction, decoding, uptake, metadata, provenance, and receiver knowledge.
All active samples use benign markers and exclude secrets, tools, egress, persistence, and state changes.